Thursday, May 3, 2012

Back to school

The Masters of Arts in Human Security and Peace Building has officially started.
I may not have much time to maintain blog entries for the next year and a half.

Hanuman

Sunday, April 1, 2012

The nuclear program of Iran


Opinion
Who should be concerned about the Iranian nuclear program?

1       Introduction

There is a growing concern of a conflict taking shape between Israel and Iran, over Iran’s nuclear program suspected of having a military dimension.
This investigation is not asking whether or not Iran is striving to get the nuclear bomb. The underlying assumption is that it is. The objective of this investigation is to come up with a comprehensive list of threats and concerns derived from a nuclear Iran.
On March 5th, 2012, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu delivered a speech to the AIPAC organization in Washington, it contained the warning below:
”[Iran and its allies] could put a nuclear device in a ship heading to any port or in a truck parked in any city, anywhere in the world”[i].
Netanyahu is referring to the threat of Iran providing nuclear material (also called the dirty bomb) to unscrupulous terrorist organizations causing a radioactivity terror in a Western capital. This threat is one of five different concerns that experts have been warning about, related to Iran’s nuclear ambitions:
  Ballistic missile strike
  Proliferation and arms race in the Middle East
  Increased Conventional Military Aggressions
  Disruption of oil supply
  Nuclear terrorism
Each one of these concerns is associated with a different region of the world. Israel is definitely at the top of Iranian targets. But the Persian Gulf, the larger Middle East, Europe and the United States are also under threat.
Firstly, the regional ambitions of the Iranian Mullah regime must be explained. Its ambitions revolve around exporting the Shiite Islamic revolution, clashing with Sunni Islam in a bitter competition.
Secondly, the concerns listed above will be reviewed in terms of the motivations of the actors, the impacted geographic area, and the likelihood that they occur.

2       The Regional Ambition of Iran

A lot can be inferred from Iran’s present view of the world, while it is not a nuclear country. How would the possession of nuclear power change its behavior?
Iran’s foreign policy is driven by essentially 2 priorities:

2.1      Economic independence

Iran’s economy is very much dependent on foreign assistance. Iran has never been able to distance itself from the capitalist world and develop an independent economic base. Historically, powerful nations like Russia, Britain and the United States have been meddling in Iran’s internal affairs interested in its natural resources. Despite having oil in abundant quantity in its soil, Iran does not have any refineries and relies on gasoline importations.
Fears and perception of foreign interference have formed the basis of Iranian nationalism[ii].

2.2      Regional supremacy

Iran sees itself as an essential actor in the Middle-East and in particular in the Persian Gulf. A Shiite theocracy, the Mullah regime is governed by religious leaders who believe it is their responsibility to export the Islamic revolution. They envision a crescent of “Shia dominated governments that will strengthen Iran and weaken the ability of the Sunni Arabs to self-defend. […]The crescent begins in Lebanon, continues through Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran, and ends in Tajikistan.”[iii] Motivated by its regional imperialism, Iran is involved in proxy wars against foreign actors whose influence is contrary to its ambition of exporting the revolution:
  Iran is supporting insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to counter the US presence in these two countries.
  Iran is involved in regional disputes in Yemen, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates [UAE] often opposed to the powerful Wahhabi regime of Saudi Arabia.
  Finally Israel is perceived as a major power that can contradict Iran’s foreign policy. Iran has been constantly trying to disrupt the Israel-Palestine peace process by supporting terrorists groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza strip[iv].
Let’s examine how this attitude is impacting the region, one country at a time.

2.2.1     The Sunni shiite Rivalry

The Sunni-Shiite rivalry has its roots in religious competition dating back to the origins of Islam. The culture of hatred between the two religious groups is as deep as the resentment for Israel by the Muslim world.
The most powerful nations of the region dominated by Sunni Islam are Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Iran is the largest country dominated by Shia Islam. The rivalry is showing in regional conflicts between Iran and Sunni Arab states and in particular with Saudi Arabia.

2.2.1.1    Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia and Iran have been competing for influence in the Middle East since the Iranian revolution. During the Iran-Iraq war, Riyadh supported Baghdad diplomatically and financially.
Saudi Arabia is led by an ultra-conservative Islamic regime following Wahhabi (or Salafist) Islam. Saudi Arabia is concerned that its own Shiite minority of two million people, frustrated by years of repression and discrimination, seeks to destabilize the regime with financial and military support from Iran.

2.2.1.2    Koweit

Kuwait’s population includes 30-40 percent Shiites also suffering from discrimination from the Sunni dominated government. Kuwait has accused Iran of maintaining sleeper cells of terrorism ready to commit acts of subversion if Iran’s nuclear plants were attacked[v].

2.2.1.3    Iraq

Iraq just transitioned from a Sunni government under Saddam Hussein to a Shia dominated government led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Since the appointment of this new government, Iran has improved its relations with Iraq. This development has made the Saudis worried about “the emergence of an anti-Saudi Shiite regime led by pro-Iranian politicians”[vi].
Iran exerts its influence in Iraq through various Shiite militia organizations, which engage in terrorism and military strikes against U.S. troops and Iraqis opposed to these forces. Iran provides weapons, rockets and road side bombs to the militias.
Iran has occasionally made military incursions into Iraqi territory and bombarded Iraqi Kurdish villages[vi].

2.2.1.4    Bahrain

Within the Gulf region, the island of Bahrain is currently an important center of Saudi-Iranian political conflict. The ruling Sunni Royal family reigns over a population composed of a Shiite majority and no more than 35 percent Sunni. Influenced by the Arab Spring, mass demonstrations took place in February 2011 to obtain political, economic reforms and democracy, and to address anti-Shiite discriminations and poverty. Saudi Arabia has been concerned about the political emergence of the Shiite majority, that could collaborate with Iranian military and intelligence organizations. Riyadh intervened to support the Sunni government of Manama. This government accused Tehran of incenting the uprising, and Hezbollah of training the opposition militarily. Tehran, furious, accused the Saudis of occupying Bahrain and requested a UN intervention[vi].

2.2.1.5    Yemen

The Yemen government has recently been destabilized by an insurgency led by the Houthi minority in the North, which is of Shiite faith. Both Saudi and Yemeni government leaders have frequently accused Iran of backing the Houthi rebels with funding, training, and material aid. They claim that this support may be provided from Lebanon by Hezbollah[vi] [vii].
Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in Northern Yemen during the 2009-2010 Winter after the insurgents crossed into Saudi territory.
It should be noted that Yemen was the theater of an Al-Qaeda led terrorist attack in October 2000, on the USS Cole destroyer, killing 17 US sailors, in the port of Aden. The Obama administration has been providing support to the Yemen government with drone strikes on the rebel militias and Al-Qaeda bases[viii].

2.2.1.6    Syria

Syria has been governed by the Alawite repressive regime of the Al-Assad’s (Hafez and Bashar) for 40 years. Syria and Libya were the only two countries supporting Tehran in the Iran-Iraq war. Iran and Syria had in common hostility towards Saddam Hussein and suspicion towards the USA. Iran has always offered its support to Syria in the case of an Israel-Syria confrontation, providing rockets and missile technology. Syria, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah refer to themselves as the “axis of resistance” against Israel.
The Saudi monarchy considers the Al-Assad a revolutionary regime. The assassination of Sunni Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005 struck a serious blow to the Syria-Saudi relations.
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are watching closely the unfolding of the Syrian uprising. The Syrian rebels have accused Iran and Hezbollah of providing technical and tactical expertise to the Syrian government. For Iran, losing Syria to the rebels would also mean losing a direct link with Hezbollah in Lebanon[vi].

2.2.1.7    Lebanon

Lebanon is a small, weak state always caught between influences of more powerful neighbours. After Saudi Arabia helped broker the 1989 Taif Accord that put an end to the civil war, Hezbollah became the only faction that retained its armed militia and territorial pockets, where the Lebanese Army was not welcome, such as the border with Israel and the Beqaa valley. Keeping control of these regions allows for the trickle of weaponry from the Syrian border destined to the South.
In June 2011, the pro-Saudi Saad Hariri government was replaced by a government led by Najib Mikati and dominated by Hezbollah.
Iran maintains its influence over Hezbollah through lavish financial and material aid. The Lebanese opposition sees Iran as an intruder and meddler in Lebanese politics and seeks support from Saudi Arabia [vi].

2.2.1.8    The Palestinian territories

Iran wants to be perceived throughout the Muslim world “as the leading militant power supporting Palestinian rights and opposing Israel, through a variety of means, including supplying weapons and funding to Palestinian Islamic militants”[vi].
In January 2002, the Israeli Defense Force captured the cargo Karine A, loaded with arms from Iran destined to the Arafat led Palestinian Authority.
Under international pressure, Saudi Arabia has officially stopped funding Hamas around 2009, letting Iran become the leading supplier of funding and military equipment to Hamas. After the overthrow of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the weapon traffic towards the Gaza strip, originating in Iran, has increased through the Sinai Peninsula.

2.3      Conclusion

Iran’s Middle East ambition of exporting the Islamist revolution has led the regime to intervene in many regional conflicts, siding with Shiite minorities, or against non-Islamic (“Infidel”) presence like Israel and the United States. As a supporter of terrorism, Iran has been isolated and can count on few friendly nations. Sanctions have caused its conventional military force to be aging for lack of replacement parts. The acquisition of nuclear power would be an asset in realizing its objectives. Let’s examine one by one the concerns raised by its nuclear program:
  Ballistic missile strike
  Proliferation and arms race in the Middle East
  Increased Conventional Military Aggressions
  Disruption of oil supply
  Nuclear terrorism

3       Ballistic missile Strike

The first threat that comes to mind, when considering Iran’s acquisition of the bomb, is the possibility that Iran would launch a ballistic missile, equipped with a nuclear head, towards a hostile country. The Iranian government is aware that such a strike would very likely bring a retaliatory strike of devastating proportion possibly annihilating a city like Tehran. No one has ever used a nuclear strike since WWII. In other words, such a move would be suicidal for the Mullah regime, therefore, analysts have been questioning whether Iran is governed by a rational leadership[ix].
Iranian President Ahmadinejad has often referred to an apocalyptic view of Shia Islam. The prophecy describes a period of extreme suffering that would bring the advent of a messianic figure, the hidden Imam or Mahdi. In some instances of Ahmadinejad’s speeches, a precondition to the messianic prophecy is that the State of Israel must be an annihilated. However, experts argue that despite its apocalyptic discourse, Iran’s post-Revolution government has always acted rationally and will continue to do so even with nuclear power in hands.
Michael Eisenstadt, from the Washington Institute for Middle East policy, explains Iran’s rationality as follows:
“The perception, however, of Iran as an irrational, undeterrable state with a high pain threshold is both anachronistic and wrong. Within the context of a relatively activist foreign policy, Iranian decision makers have generally sought to minimize risk by shunning direct confrontation and by acting through surrogates (such as the Lebanese Hezbollah) or by means of stealth (Iranian small boat and mine operations against shipping in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War) in order to preserve deniability and create ambiguity about their intentions. Such behavior is evidence of an ability to engage in rational calculation and to accurately assess power relationships.”[x].
Alan M. Dershowitz from the Harvard Law Schools raises objections to the concept of “deterrence by mutually assured destruction”, questioning “whether any civilized country—the United States or Israel—should be willing to kill millions of Iranian civilians because their leaders made a decision to use nuclear weapons against Israel or the United States” and “whether it would be legal, under the laws of war, to target millions of civilians in a retaliatory nuclear attack”[xi].
In the case where deterrence is failing to stop Iran from using its nuclear power, which country could be targeted?
Israel has been identified by the Mullah regime as the number one target. The presence of a Jewish state at the heart of Daar al Islam (the land of Islam) with Jerusalem for capital, which is also the third holiest place in Islam, is simply unacceptable for the Iranian leaders.
Other targets of a direct nuclear strike in the Middle East could be any nation that would oppose Iranian ambitions in expanding its Shia influence, more likely a Sunni dominated regime like Saudi Arabia or Turkey.
Along with its nuclear development, Iran has been developing ballistic missiles having increasing range capability. It is estimated that the current generation of Shahab-3 missile has a range just short of Europe’s southern flank from the Iranian territory, or 2100 km. European countries, having powerful military capacity, that could try to disrupt Iran’s territorial ambitions like France, UK or Germany, are currently out-of-range from Iran or even from Lebanon or Syria. The territory of America is also out-of-range but not American bases in the Gulf, in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The threat of an Iranian ballistic strike is mostly a concern for Israel, for American troops in the Middle-East and for powerful Sunni dominated regimes like Turkey and Saudi Arabia. If the Iranian leaders behave rationally, deterrence by mutually assured destruction makes the threat unlikely. Still, the fear of a nuclear Iran is pushing more Middle Eastern countries towards acquiring nuclear power themselves.

4       The threat of Proliferation and Arms Race

Proliferation is by far the most discussed consequence of a nuclear Iran. Distinction must be made between 2 kinds of proliferation:
  a technology transfer from Iran to an ally
  an arms race amongst vulnerable neighbours hostile to Iran

4.1      Technology transfer

The Iranian leaders have expressed their desire to share their nuclear knowledge and experience in, at least, two occasions:
On September 15th, 2005 during a meeting with Turkish Erdogan at the UN General Assembly, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad conceded “Iran is ready to transfer nuclear know-how to the Islamic countries due to their need”[xii].
On April 25th, 2006 Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated to the Sudanese president: "Iran's nuclear capability is one example of various scientific capabilities in the country. The Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to transfer the experience, knowledge and technology of its scientists"[xiii].
Sudan is one of the most unstable countries in Africa, caught in a protracted conflict with South Sudan, having harboured notorious terrorists like Osama Bin Laden, after he was expelled from Saudi Arabia. Nuclear technology transfer to a country like Sudan would be a disaster.
Syria already tried to build secretly a nuclear plant that was annihilated by Israel Air Force in September 2007. Syria chose to get its technology transfer from North Korea, with perhaps some contribution from Iran[xiv] .

4.2      Arms Race

Experts are convinced that following in the footsteps of Iran, a whole range of countries will pursue nuclear military power for their own deterrence against the Iranian bomb.
J. S. Yaphe and C. D. Lutes propose a list of countries potentially interested in nuclear power:
“Despite skepticism over falling dominos in the Middle East, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Iranian case will affect choices yet to be made by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey”[xv].
Let’s examine the motivations behind each of these countries listed by Yaphe & Lutes.

4.2.1     TURKEY

Turkey is widely seen as one country willing to go nuclear after Iran. These comments about Turkey’s suspicion of striving for a nuclear umbrella were written in 2005:
“Turks worry about the reliability of both NATO and U.S. commitments to Turkish defense in Middle Eastern contingencies, and Turkey will be strongly affected by changes in alliance strategy, missions, and cohesion, all of which are in flux”[x].
More precisely:
“The sources of Turkish concern are straightforward.
First, Turkey’s secular elites, including the military, increasingly have been concerned about the export of Islamic radicalism from Iran. […]
Second, Iran is a key player with regard to the Kurdish issue in its regional setting, and relations on Kurdish matters continue to be a leading barometer of Turkish-Iranian relations as a whole.[…]
Third, as noted earlier, Turkey increasingly has been concerned about the influence of WMD and missile proliferation on the security environment, its own regional freedom of action, and that of its alliance partners.”[x]
With Turkey now under the presidency of Erdogan, relationships between Turkey and Europe have deteriorated for a few reasons:
  Turkey is sliding towards Islamism
  Tensions have appeared with Cyprus, an EU member, and with Israel regarding gas fields in the Mediterranean sea
  Tensions were renewed with Israel regarding the Gaza flotilla that included the Turkish Mavi Marmara ship, intercepted by Israel on May 30th, 2010.
So the remark regarding Turkey’s suspicion of its European alliance is all the more accurate today.
Turkey’s nuclear acquisition could be the trigger of more proliferation:
“Already within range of the current Shahab missile, Ankara could decide to pursue its own nuclear agenda to counterbalance a nuclear-armed Iran. This would place original NATO members in a precarious position in regard to their southernmost NATO ally and probably would be more destabilizing than a nuclear-protected Gulf. While unlikely to spur additional nuclear proliferation in the European region, Turkish nuclear weapons acquisition could increase tension within the NATO alliance and raise pressure on the Gulf States to do the same.”[xv].

4.2.2     THE GULF STATES

The term “Gulf States”, here, includes all the countries surrounding the Gulf of Hormuz outside of Iran: It is comprised of Iraq plus the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman.
In the section describing Iran’s ambitions, some Gulf States were shown to be involved in regional disputes with Iran. For theses Gulf States, the alternative consisting in relying on a nuclear umbrella provided by the USA places them in an uncomfortable position:
“Opposition to American occupation of Iraq is a common cry in the Gulf, and no Gulf government wants to appear to be providing the United States with military bases, assistance, or access to facilities. Moreover, reliance on the United States for defence against other regional states has come to be seen by many in the region as an admission that regimes are incapable of providing for the national security.” [xv].
Providing for their national security without the United States is an incentive for the Gulf States to get their own nuclear power.
Clifford D. May provides reasons for the Gulf States to go nuclear:
“A nuclear-armed Iran would challenge the Saudi clan’s claim to be the rightful guardian of [the holy cities of] Mecca and Medina and embolden Arabia’s Shia minority. It would threaten the small states in the region, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Bahrain among them. It would dominate Iraq (where its influence has been growing as American forces have withdrawn) and Afghanistan (from which American forces soon will withdraw).”[xvi]

4.2.3     SYRIA

The case of Syria is currently unpredictable. Syria has already made an attempt to build a nuclear plant that was destroyed by Israeli Air Force in September 2007. Syrian president Bashar al Assad is caught in a civil war. The outcome of that war could be a pro-Iranian Alawite regime or a Sunni regime. Some Sunni rebels have expressed sympathy for Israel and could dramatically alter Syria’s foreign policy, cutting its support to Hezbollah in Lebanon (who is widely perceived as having participated in the massacres of Syrian civilians). A Sunni Syrian government could sign a peace agreement with Israel that includes a nuclear umbrella. These are just speculations[xvii].

4.2.4     EGYPT

The same uncertainty exists regarding post-Mubarak Egypt.
“Egypt had incentive to contemplate nuclear weapons well before Iran’s nuclear weapons came to the foreground in regional politics. The Egyptians, notwithstanding the peace treaty with Israel, have long resented Israel’s nuclear weapons program that they see as a substantial source of Israeli political leverage over Egypt and the other Arab states. Cairo has long pressed diplomatically for a nuclear free zone in the Middle East as a means to negotiate away Israel’s unilateral nuclear weapons advantage in the region. Cairo has long warned that it could reconsider its nuclear weapons restraint if the Israelis indefinitely refuse to negotiate for a nuclear free zone.”[x]
The Arab Spring has led Egypt to general elections. These elections are spread over several months and the outcome is currently unknown. A victory by Islamist party Muslim Brotherhood would bring a government in friendly terms with Iran, contrary to Mubarak who was hostile.
It should be noted that Arab’s concern about Israel’s nuclear capability is widely seen as fuelling more nuclear arm race. I would argue that when the Arab coalition launched the 1973 Yom Kippur war, Israel already had the nuclear bomb. This did not deter Egypt and Syria to launch that war. By contrast with Iran, Israel is unanimously perceived as a rational democratic country that would not use its nuclear arsenal unless its survival was at stake. Besides, the close geographic proximity of Israel with many of its enemies like Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Syria combined with the randomness of radioactive contaminations (affected by the wind direction) makes Israel’s nuclear deterrence futile with neighbours in proximity.

4.3      Conclusion

Technology transfer of nuclear know-how has been a concern for the Western world in prior instances and coming from Asian nations. North Korea has demonstrated it is willing to transgress the rules with Syria. The father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, A. Q. Khan has been accused of leading an international proliferation network[xviii] [xix]. Therefore, Iran, having expressed its willingness to share its knowledge, must be taken seriously.
A natural response to Iran’s nuclear threat, for many Middle Eastern countries, is to acquire nuclear power themselves. The fear of a domino effect is real.
Nevertheless, embolden by its newly acquired non-conventional power, Iran could assert its foreign policy more aggressively, using conventional military power to limit the risk of retaliations.

5       Increased Conventional Military Agressions

Nuclear power is a convincing argument for Iran to resolve regional disputes by force rather than negotiations. Small Arab states in the Gulf that are not willing to acquire nuclear weapons would be particularly vulnerable. The United Arab Emirates is one such example:
“The UAE perceives the Iranians as a threat more acutely than their Gulf Arab counterparts. The UAE still harbors resentment toward the Iranians for their occupation of the contested territories of Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands. The UAE might calculate that Iran’s nuclear weapons will reduce, if not eliminate, what little incentive Tehran has to negotiate a settlement to the island disputes, as well as embolden Tehran to take even more assertive actions against the UAE.” [x].
Sokolski and Clawson suggest a list of regional issues for which Iran could apply a more aggressive policy:
“With a real or virtual nuclear arsenal at its disposal, Iran’s leaders may be emboldened to take more aggressive steps to assert its pre-eminence and to weaken competitors. A few examples include:
Saudi Arabia.
Iran will resist Saudi efforts to step up oil production in order to lower world oil prices, and will want Saudi Arabia to feel the heat of Iran’s new power. A nuclear ready Iran could feel emboldened to step up its support for Saudi terrorist groups and direct them to sabotage or otherwise attack Saudi oil installations, should the Saudis refuse to decrease production.
Iraq.
The Iranian government pursued an aggressive campaign of subversion against the Iraqi Governing Council following Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. It supported renegade Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, beamed anti-American propaganda into Iraq on 42 Arabic-language radio and television stations, and built a network of social services in southern Iraq that bested those provided by the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). A nuclear-ready Iran could step up subversion inside Iraq (attacks on oil installations, U.S. and Iraqi forces), with the goals of scaling back Iraqi oil exports, driving the United States to withdraw its troops, and preventing the emergence of a strong central Iraqi government that could challenge Iran.
Qatar.
Iran is competing with Qatar to attract international investment to develop a massive shared gas field in the Persian Gulf. (The Iranians refer to the offshore gas field as South Pars; the Qataris call it the North Dome.) They are also competing to supply natural gas to India and Pakistan. Fear of a natural gas “glut” could lead Iran to seek to limit foreign investment in Qatari gas projects.
Turkey.
Iran’s main economic competitor in the region is Turkey. Should Turkey’s secular parties or the military replace the current Islamic governing party, Iran could resume its support for Islamic terrorist groups to destabilize Turkey.
U.S. bases
[Iran could renew] calls to end the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, which the Islamic Republic views as a direct challenge to its predominance. The Islamic Republic has long sought to force the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the Gulf.”[x]
Countries that currently host U.S. military bases in the Gulf are: Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates [UAE], Bahrain, and Oman.

5.1      Conclusion

Protected by the deterrence provided by its nuclear umbrella, it would be natural for Iran to increase conventional military aggressions in order to fulfill its regional ambitions.
J. S. Yaphe and C. D. Lutes object with a belief in enhanced deterrence:
“An Iran emboldened by nuclear weapons might become more assertive in the region, but superior U.S. conventional capabilities and strengthened regional partnerships would probably deter Iran from significant mischief, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking U.S. forces directly.”[xv]
Cutting the oil supply in the Strait of Hormuz is a leverage that Iran could use to artificially boost the price of oil. Let’s examine this option.

6       Disruption of oil supply

In January 2012, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz after a US airplane carrier, the USS Stennis, sailed into the North Arabian Sea. Iranian officials have threatened to blockade the strait if an oil embargo is imposed, by Europe and the USA, in response to the Iranian nuclear program. Such a move would prevent Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates from exporting oil and gas. Asian nations like China, Japan, India, South Korea rely heavily on oil from the Gulf but Europe and the United States have somewhat diversified their sources.
The oil embargo of 2012 from the US and Europe went ahead anyway[xx]. Most Middle East analysts do not believe that Iran can completely close the strait. They claim that closing the strait would penalize Iran’s oil export based economy more than everyone else’s. Unless underwater mines are used, why could not Iran stop all boat traffic except the tankers bound for Iran?
The Gulf closure would raise the oil price artificially and would be considered a casus belli by the USA and China thus triggering a military reaction. Deterrence is currently working against a full blockade of the Strait. Would it still be the case if Iran had the nuclear bomb?
Analysts believe a partial blockade is a stronger possibility. They have considered its usage by Iran as a retaliatory measure to an external aggression or to gain leverage in a localized dispute (the Islands of Abu Musa and Tunbs are claimed by both Iran and the UAE)[xxi]. Iranians can use small boats, mines, submarines, anti-ship cruise missiles and divers to disrupt the traffic in the strait, to cause nuisance or target a specific country[xxii]. Iranians have attacked Kuwaiti tankers carrying oil for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. An American frigate was hit by an Iranian mine in 1988. This caused a series of incidents between Iran and the USA.
Iran has only ever threatened to blockade the Strait of Hormuz like in early 2012. As fragile economies were weary of an increase in oil price, Iran was hoping for the world community to diffuse the crisis by withdrawing sanctions against its economy. That did not work. Iran has, in some instances, harassed a selected set of tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, belonging to a targeted nation.

6.1      Conclusion

If Iran was in possession of nuclear capabilities, the Islamic Republic could use a partial or complete blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, in a situation where the world community was to interfere in its foreign policy, for example by impeding Iran’s attempt to export its Islamist revolution to a place like Iraq, Syria or Lebanon:
“Some Iranian decision makers might believe that “the bomb” might provide them with a free hand to take such steps with relative impunity, by deterring an effective response by its neighbors or the United States.” [x].
Another tool that the Iranian regime has been using, for a long time, to destabilize its enemies is terrorism by proxy. How would terrorist factions make use of nuclear power provided by Iran?

7       Nuclear terrorism

7.1      Various Delivery modes

The idea behind nuclear terrorism is to trigger a small nuclear bomb or to disperse radioactive material within an urban area and produce fear of radioactive contamination (in addition to the damage caused by the explosion). Michael Eisenstadt has considered various ways of delivering the material:
“[Iran could] deliver nonconventional weapons against targets in the Middle East and beyond, by aircraft, land-based ballistic missiles, and by various non-traditional means such as ship-based ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, boats, and terrorists.
[Iran] might produce nuclear naval mines and nuclear-tipped anti-ship missiles (for use against U.S. aircraft carriers), and perhaps eventually, man portable nuclear devices (the so-called, but inaccurately labeled, “suitcase nukes”) for use by Iranian special forces or foreign terrorist groups aligned with Tehran.” [x].

The “suitcase nukes” scenario refers to the situation where terrorists detonate a small nuclear bomb. It presents the following difficulties[xxiii]:

Terrorists must steal, purchase or be given the radioactive material by a rogue state. The risk of retaliation on that state is about as high as in the case of a ballistic nuclear strike.
Transportation is an issue. At least 10 kg of material must be delivered to the target destination.
Detonating a nuclear bomb requires nanosecond accurate synchronization to cause a chain reaction.

By contrast, an easier way to cause terror is the “dirty bomb” containing radioactive material.
This scenario is logistically much easier to implement and the psychological impact very high. Various radioactive products may be used from medical to military origin. They may be dispersed by an explosion, in the air or by water contamination. The only risk for the terrorist is exposure to radioactivity which is irrelevant for a shahid (a martyr or suicide bomber).

The nuclear terrorism threat should be taken seriously as it has already been attempted:
It is believed that Osama bin Laden tried to obtain nuclear material[xxiv].
The Iraqi government has tested in 1987 a radioactive dispersion bomb[xxv].

In the current context, which terrorists groups affiliated to Iran would be candidates for nuclear terrorism and who would be the target?

7.2      Iran’s collaboration with terrorist groups

The 1979 Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini led to the hostage crisis at the US Embassy in Tehran. Since then, Iran has been supporting terrorists groups in various parts of the world, both Shiite and Sunni.

7.2.1     HEZBOLLAH

Hezbollah is a Shiite terrorist organization based in Lebanon and a political member of the Lebanese government. Its objective is, in high priority, to resist Israel’s “occupation of Lebanese territory” and, in lower priority, to dominate Lebanese politics in order to create an Islamic state on the model of Iran[xxvi] [xxvii]. It claims that Israel occupies a Lebanese territory called “the Sheba farms” at the foothills of the Golan Heights, under Syrian sovereignty until 1973. It has received extensive support from Iran: financial support, military support including rockets and missiles but also training in Iran and assistance from Revolutionary Guards, inside Lebanon, in particular during the 2006 war against Israel.
Hezbollah has been constantly trying to disrupt the Israel-Palestine peace process. It has successfully harmed Israeli, American, French interests and is behind the following terrorist attacks:
  Explosion of the US Embassy, US Marine and French barracks in Lebanon in 1983
  Bombing of Israeli and Jewish targets in Argentina in 1992 and 1994
  Hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985
  Assassination of Lebanese President Rafic Hariri in 2005
  Bombing targeting Israeli diplomats in Bangkok and New Delhi in 2012[xxviii]
Hezbollah operates worldwide. It is a good candidate for nuclear terrorism targeting Israeli interests. Due to the proximity of Israel with Lebanon, a delivery by speed boat or unmanned aircraft over the border is easily conceivable.

7.2.2     HAMAS

Hamas in Gaza is the offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood founded in Egypt. The brotherhood is an Islamist political party of Egypt that has been gaining strength since the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak. In Gaza, the Hamas constitutes the government and a terrorist group. The Gaza strip harbours terrorist movements like Islamic Jihad, Al Aqsa Martyrs, Qassam Brigade, and the Popular Resistance Committee. The Hamas has carried out terrorist acts itself. All these militia are targeting mostly Israeli interests using terrorist attacks inside its borders or launching rockets from Gaza. Despite being Sunni Islamist, they also benefit, like Hezbollah, from Iranian support financially and militarily, having a common enemy, Israel and to a lesser extend the USA.
The most spectacular terrorist attacks from one of these groups are:
  Islamic Jihad: Attack on a bus in 1989 and again in 1990
  Hamas: Explosion of a bus in Afula in 1994
  Islamic Jihad: Suicide bombing of a Tel Aviv night club in 2001
  Hamas: Explosion of a Netanya hotel in 2002
  Islamic Jihad: Suicide bombing of a Haifa restaurant in 2003
  Popular resistance Committee: Incursion from Sinai followed by bus attack in 2011
Hamas is a potential threat from nuclear terrorism against Israel using a dirty bomb, a speedboat or an unmanned aerial vehicle.

7.2.3     AL QAEDA


Al Qaeda is waging global jihad worldwide against interests of the Western world.
Al Qaeda has allegedly received, from Iran and Hezbollah, training in explosives, intelligence and document forgery. Iran facilitated the transit of al Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan including the 9/11 hijackers[xxix].
The movement has successfully executed the following terrorist acts[xxx]:

  The Khobar Tower bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996 (Saudi Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda cooperation)
  The USS Cole in Yemen in 2002
  The Bali night club bombing in 2002
  The Madrid train bombing in 2004 (al Qaeda inspired)
  The London subway bombing in 2005
  The September 11th, 2011 attack on American soil

Al Qaeda has previously attempted to obtain radioactive material[xxxi]. The potential targets could be any European or American interest at home or abroad. Al Qaeda has shown innovation in delivering a terrorist attack: Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber” attempted to bomb an American Airlines flight in 2001 using explosive in his shoes and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the “underwear bomber” attempted to bomb a Northwest Airlines flight in 2009 using liquid explosive. These examples show the efforts to elude explosive detection devices and come up with new ideas to produce maximum damage. The dirty bomb is one such idea.

7.3      Conclusion

Despite objections that nuclear terrorism has never been attempted before[xxxii], the terrorist groups listed above have shown resourcefulness to find ways of inflicting damage and terrorizing populations. Nuclear terrorism seems like an option they could consider. The possible targets would be Israel and the Western world.

8       General Conclusion

One characteristic of the Middle East is how quickly an assessment becomes obsolete: five years ago, Turkey and Egypt would have been perceived as allies of Israel in an Israel-Iran confrontation. With the likelihood of a Muslim Brotherhood government emerging from Egyptian elections and with Islamist President Erdogan in power in Turkey, the alliance between Israel, Egypt and Turkey is, to say the least, shaky. Making predictions as the Arab Spring’s dust has not settled, in particular, in Syria, must be done with extreme cautions.
Predicting the behavior of the Iranian leaders is also a challenge:
“Nevertheless, the lack of confirmable information on Iran’s leaders, particularly on how they make decisions, what they fear, if they have a concept of deterrence, or whether they appreciate implicit redlines set by countries with whom they have no contact—the United States and Israel—makes forecasting this issue very difficult.”[xv]
Despite these limitations, the concerns listed below have been identified as consequences of Iran acquiring nuclear power.

Threat
Agent
Target
Motivation
Ballistic Strike
Iran
Israel, US bases
Apocalyptic conception of Islam, Retaliation
Proliferation and Arms race
The Gulf States, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Afghanistan
Iran
Deterrence against Iran’s bomb or Technology transfer from Iran
Increased Conventional Military Aggression
Iran
Gulf States, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel
Regional Ambitions
Disruption of oil supply
Iran
Gulf States, Asian market
Regional Ambitions
Nuclear terrorism
Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas
Israel, Europe, United States
Global Jihad

Although quasi-suicidal, a limited ballistic nuclear strike on Israel or an American base in the Persian Gulf cannot be ignored.
The natural reaction of Middle-East actors to Iran becoming a nuclear power would be a proliferation of nuclear countries while Iran could share its knowledge with allied states. Alternatively, Arab nations could lobby for a denuclearized Middle-East and would probably meet fierce opposition from Israel.
Iran could take advantage of its military superiority to achieve its dream of exporting the Islamist revolution creating a Shia dominated crescent covering Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran. It could destabilize opponents to its ambitions by disrupting the oil supply or launching a wave of nuclear terrorist attacks.
In the case where boycott and sanctions fail to stop Iran’s nuclear program, the next responses are:
  accepting to live with the threat, existential for Israel, manageable for the rest of the world
  launching a strike on nuclear installations and missile bases in Iran

8.1      Which country should be the one to deliver a blow to Iran’s nuclear program?

I don’t believe it is Israel’s job to eliminate the threat from Iran. Israel is the 5th largest military power, but the country has no geographic depth, and is surrounded with hostile countries on all sides. In the case of a strike, it will have to deal with the reaction of Iranian proxy militias (Hezbollah and Hamas), a possible chemical or bacteriological strike from Syria, and hostile reactions from the Muslim world (Egypt, Jordan, Palestinian Territories). If it went at it alone, it would send the wrong message that the Iranian threat is a threat for Israel only. The USA suffers from the same kind of hostility from the Arab world after the long wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, and should not accomplish the mission on its own either, as the mission would be perceived as an offensive from the “Infidels” onto the Muslim world.
When Saddam Hussein's troops invaded Kuwait, the Western world sent a coalition led by the USA and including Arab nations to liberate Kuwait. Even if some Arab countries’ contribution was just symbolic, their presence gave a meaning to the intervention that it was a war against a dictator’s imperialist move. Similarly, the intervention in Libya was led by a European coalition against a dictator oppressing its own citizens.
A strike on Iran’s nuclear installations, avoiding civilian targets at all costs, should be executed by a similar coalition that excludes Israel but includes the USA, European nations and Arabic nations, because Iran’s nuclear program represents a threat for the free world.



[ii] Ehteshami, A. (2002). The Foreign Policy of Iran. In R. Hinnebusch, & A. Ehteshami, The Foreign Policy of Middle East States (p. 381). Lynne Rienner Publishers
[xxvi] Harik, J. P. (2004). Hezbollah The changing face of terrorism. New York: I.B.Tauris
[xxvii] Azani, E. (2009). Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God - from Revolution to Institutionalization. New York: Plagrave MacMillan